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Abstract. The lattice model proposed by Denning in her seminal work
provided secure information flow analyses with an intuitive and uniform
mathematical foundation. Different organisations, however, may employ
quite different security lattices. In this paper, we propose a connection
framework that permits different organisations to exchange information
while maintaining both security of information flows as well as their au-
tonomy in formulating and maintaining security policy. Our prescriptive
framework is based on the rigorous mathematical framework of Lagois
connections given by Melton, together with a simple operational model
for transferring object data between domains. The merit of this formu-
lation is that it is simple, minimal, adaptable and intuitive, and pro-
vides a formal framework for establishing secure information flow across
autonomous interacting organisations. We show that our framework is
semantically sound, by proving that the connections proposed preserve
standard correctness notions such as non-interference.
Keywords: Security class lattice · Information flow · Lagois connection
· Atomic operations · Non-interference.
1 Introduction
Denning’s seminal work [7] proposed complete lattices as the appropriate math-
ematical framework for questions regarding secure information flow (SIF). An
information flow model (IFM) is characterised as 〈N,P, SC,⊔,⊑〉 where: Storage
objects in N are assigned security levels drawn from a (finite) complete lattice
SC. P is a set of processes (also assigned security classes as clearances). The
partial ordering ⊑ represents permitted flows between classes; reflexivity and
transitivity capture intuitive aspects of information flow; antisymmetry helps
avoid redundancies in the framework, and the join operation ⊔ succinctly cap-
tures the combination of information belonging to different security classes in
arithmetic, logical and computational operations. This lattice model provides an
abstract uniform framework that identifies the commonalities of the variety of
analyses for different applications – e.g., confidentiality and trust – whether at
the language level or a system level. In the ensuing decades, the vast body of se-
cure information flow analyses has been built on these mathematical foundations,
with the development of a plethora of static and dynamic analysis techniques
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for programming languages [13,15,17,19–21], operating systems [2,8,12,20,25],
databases [22], and hardware architectures [9, 27], etc. The soundness of this
lattice model was expressed in terms of semantic notions of system behaviour,
for instance, as properties like non-interference [10] by Volpano et al [23] and
others. Alternative semantic notions of security such as safety properties have
been proposed as well, e.g., [1], but for brevity we will not explore these further.
The objective of this paper is to propose a simple way in which large-scale
distributed secure systems can be built by connecting components in a secure and
modular manner. Our work begins with the observation that large information
systems are not monolithic: Different organisations define their own informa-
tion flow policies independently, and subsequently collaborate or federate with
one another to exchange information. In general, the security classes and the
lattices of any two organisations may be quite different — there is no single uni-
versal security class lattice. Moreover, modularity and autonomy are important
requirements since each organisation would naturally wish to retain control over
its own security policies and the ability to redefine them. Therefore, fusing dif-
ferent lattices by taking their union is an unsatisfactory approach, more so since
the security properties of application programs would have to be re-established
in this possibly enormous lattice.
When sharing information, most organisations limit the cross-domain com-
munications to a limited set of security classes (which we call transfer classes).
In order to ensure that shared data are not improperly divulged, two organisa-
tions usually negotiate agreements or memorandums of understanding (MoUs),
promising that they will respect the security policies of the other organisation.
We argue that a good notion of secure connection should require reasoning only
about those flows from only the transfer classes mentioned in a MoU. Usually,
cross-domain communication involves downgrading the security class of priv-
ileged information to public information using primitives such as encryption,
and then upgrading the information to a suitable security class in the other do-
main. Such approaches, however, do not gel well with correctness notions such
as non-interference. Indeed the question of how to translate information between
security classes of different lattices is interesting [6].
Contributions of this paper. In this paper, we propose a simple framework
and sufficient conditions under which secure flow guarantees can be enforced
without exposing the complexities and details of the component information
flow models. The framework consists of (1) a way to connect security classes
of one organisation to those in another while satisfying intuitive requirements;
(2) a simple language that extends the operations within an organisation with
primitives for transferring data between organisations; and (3) a type system
and operational model for these constructs, which we use to establish that the
framework conserves security.
In §2, we first identify, using intuitive examples, violations in secure flow
that may arise when two secure systems are permitted to exchange information
in both directions. Based on these lacunae, we formulate security and precision
requirements for secure bidirectional flow. We then propose a framework that
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guarantees the absence of such policy violations, without impinging on the au-
tonomy of the individual systems, without the need for re-verifying the security
of the application procedures in either of the domains, and confining the analysis
to only the transfer classes involved in potential exchange of data. Our approach
is based on monotone functions and an elegant theory of connections [16] be-
tween the security lattices. Theorem 2 shows that Lagois connections between
the security lattices satisfy the security and precision requirements.
We present, in §3, a minimal operational language consisting of a small set
of atomic primitives to effect the transfer of data between domains. The frame-
work is simple and can be adapted for establishing secure connections between
distributed systems at any level of abstraction (language, system, database, ...).
We assume each domain uses atomic transactional operations for object ma-
nipulation and intra-domain computation. The primitives of our model include
reliable communication between two systems, transferring object data in desig-
nated output variables of one domain to designated input variables of a specified
security class in the other domain. We also assume a generic set of operations in
each domain for copying data from input variables to domain objects, and from
domain objects to output variables. To avoid interference between inter-domain
communication and the computations within the domains, we assume that the
sets of designated input and output variables are all mutually exclusive of one
another, and also with the program/system variables used in the computations
within each domain. Thus by design we avoid the usual suspects that cause
interference and insecure transfer of data. The operational description of the
language consists of the primitives together with their execution rules (§3.1).
The correctness of our framework is demonstrated by expressing soundness
(with respect to the operational semantics) of a type system (§3.2), stated in
terms of the security lattices and their connecting functions. In particular, Theo-
rem 8 shows the standard semantic property of non-interference in both domains
holds of all operational behaviours. We adapt and extend the approach taken
by Volpano et al [23] to encompass systems coupled using the Lagois connection
conditions (and assuming atomicity of the data transfer operations), to show
that security is conserved. We believe that our formulation is general enough to
be applicable to other behavioural notions of secure information flow as a safety
property [1].
In §4, we briefly review some related work. We conclude in §5 with a discus-
sion on our approach and directions for future work.
2 Lagois Connections and All That
Motivating Examples. Consider a university system in which students study
in semi-autonomously administered colleges (one such is C) that are affiliated
to a university (U). The university also has “university professors” with whom
students can take classes. We assume each institution has established the security
of its information flow mechanisms and policies.
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⊤2⊤1
CollegePrincipal
Dean (F )
Faculty
Dean (S)
Student
⊥1
Chancellor
V ice Chancellor
Dean(Colleges)
Univ.Fac.
⊥2
Fig. 1. Green arrows represent permit-
ted flows according to the information
exchange arrangement between a col-
lege and a university. Red dashed ar-
rows highlight a new flow that is a se-
curity violation.
⊤2⊤1
CollegePrincipal
Dean (F )
Faculty
Dean (S)
Student
⊥1
Chancellor
V ice Chancellor
Dean(Colleges)
Univ.Fac.
⊥2
Fig. 2. Unidirectional flow: If the blue
arrows denote identified flows connect-
ing important classes, then the green
arrows are constrained by monotonic-
ity to lie between them.
We first observe that formulating an agreement between the institutions that
respects the flow policies within the institutions is not entirely trivial. Consider
an arrangement where the college Faculty and University Faculty can share in-
formation (say, course material and examinations), and the Dean of Colleges
in the University can exchange information (e.g., students’ official grade-sheets)
with the college’s Dean of Students. Even such an apparently reasonable arrange-
ment suffers from insecurities, as illustrated in Fig. 1 by the flow depicted using
dashed red arrows, where information can flow from the college’s Faculty to the
college’s Dean of Students. (Moral: internal structure of the lattices matters.)
As long as information flows unidirectionally from colleges to the University,
monotone functions from the security classes of the college lattice C to uni-
versity security lattice U suffice to ensure secure information flow. A function
α : C → U is called monotone if whenever sc1 ⊑ sc2 in C then α(sc1) ⊑
′ α(sc2)
in U .1 Monotonicity also constrains possible flows between classes of the two do-
mains, once certain important flows between certain classes have been identified
(see Fig. 2). Moreover, since monotone functions are closed under composition,
one can chain them to create secure unidirectional information flow connections
through a series of administrative domains. Monotonicity is a basic principle
adopted for information flow analyses, e.g. [13].
However, when there is “blowback” of information, mere monotonicity is
inadequate for ensuring SIF. Consider the bidirectional flow situation in Fig.
3, where data return to the original domain. Monotonicity of both functions
α : C → U and γ : U → C does not suffice for security because the composition
1 Note that it’s not necessary to make the function α total or onto.
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⊤2⊤1
CollegePrincipal
Dean (F )
Faculty
Dean (S)
Student
⊥1
Chancellor
V ice Chancellor
Dean(Colleges)
Univ.Fac.
⊥2
Fig. 3. The blue/green and brown/red
arrows define monotone functions in
each direction. However, the red arrow
highlights a flow that is a security vio-
lation.
⊤2⊤1
CollegePrincipal
Dean (F )
Faculty
Dean (S)
Student
⊥1
Chancellor
V ice Chancellor
Dean(Colleges)
Univ.Fac.
⊥2
Fig. 4. The arrows define a secure and
precise connection. However, the secu-
rity classification escalates quickly in a
few round-trips, when information can
flow in both directions.
γ ◦α may not be non-decreasing. In Fig. 3, both α and γ are monotone but their
composition can lead to information leaking from a higher class, e.g., College
Principal, to a lower class, e.g., Faculty within C — an outright violation of the
college’s security policy. Similarly, composition α◦γ may lead to violation of the
University’s security policy.
m2γ(m2)
l1 α(l1)
l2 α(l2)
γ(m1) m1
Fig. 5. Secure flow conditions: (sc1) l1⊑γ(m2) (sc2) m1⊑
′α(l2).
Requirements. We want to ensure that any “round-trip” flow of information,
e.g., from a domain L to M and back to L, is a permitted flow in the lattice L,
from where the data originated. Thus we require the following (tersely stated)
“security conditions” SC1 and SC2 on α : L → M and γ : M → L, which
preclude any violation of the security policies of both the administrative domains
(see Fig. 5):
SC1 λl.l ⊑ γ ◦ α SC2 λm.m ⊑ α ◦ γ
We also desire precision, based on a principle of least privilege escalation — if
data are exchanged between the two domains without any computation done
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on them, then the security level should not be needlessly raised. Precision is
important for meaningful and useful analyses.
PC1 α(l1) =
⊔
{m1 | γ(m1) = l1}, ∀l1 ∈ γ[M ]
PC2 γ(m1) =
⊔
{l1 | α(l1) = m1}, ∀m1 ∈ α[L]
Further, if the data were to go back and forth between two domains more than
once, the security classes to which data belong should not become increasingly
restrictive after consecutive bidirectional data sharing (See Fig. 4, which shows
monotone functions that keep climbing up to the top). This convergence re-
quirement may be stated informally as conditions CC1 and CC2, requiring
fixed points for the compositions γ ◦α and α◦γ. Since security lattices are finite,
CC1 and CC2 necessarily hold – such fixed points exist, though perhaps only
at the topmost elements of the lattice. We would therefore desire a stronger re-
quirement, where fixed points are reached as low in the orderings as possible.
⊤2⊤1
CollegePrincipal
Dean (F )
Faculty
Dean (S)
Student
⊥1
Chancellor
V ice Chancellor
Dean(Colleges)
Univ.Fac.
⊥2
Fig. 6. The arrows define a Galois Con-
nection. However, the red arrows high-
light flow security violations when in-
formation can flow in both directions.
⊤2⊤1
CollegePrincipal
Dean (F )
Faculty
Dean (S)
Student
⊥1
Chancellor
V ice
Chancellor
Dean(Colleges)
Univ.Fac.
⊥2
Fig. 7. A useful increasing Lagois con-
nection for sharing data. Black arrows
define permissible flows between buds.
Galois connections aren’t the answer. Any discussion on a pair of partial
orders linked by a pair of monotone functions suggests the notion of a Galois
connection, an elegant and ubiquitous mathematical structure that finds use in
computing, particularly in static analyses. However, Galois connections are not
the appropriate structure for bidirectional informational flow control.
Let L and M be two complete security class lattices, and α : L → M and
γ : M → L be two monotone functions such that (L, α, γ,M) forms a Galois
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connection. Recall that a Galois connection satisfies the condition
GC1 ∀l1 ∈ L,m1 ∈M, α(l1) ⊑
′ m1 ⇐⇒ l1 ⊑ γ(m1)
So in a Galois connection we have α(γ(m1)) ⊑
′ m1 ⇐⇒ γ(m1) ⊑ γ(m1). Since
γ(m1) ⊑ γ(m1) holds trivially, we get α(γ(m1)) ⊑
′ m1. If α(γ(m1)) 6=
′ m1 then
α(γ(m1)) ⊏
′ m1 (strictly), which would violate secure flow requirement SC2.
Fig. 6 illustrates such a situation.
Why not Galois insertions? Now suppose L and M are two complete security
class lattices, and α : L → M and γ : M → L be two monotone functions
such that (L, α, γ,M) forms a Galois insertion. Then the flow of information
permitted by α and γ is guaranteed to be secure. However, Galois insertions
mandate conditions on the definitions of functions α and γ that are much too
strong, i.e.,
– γ :M → L is injective, i.e., ∀m1,m2 ∈M : γ(m1) = γ(m2) =⇒ m1 = m2
– α : L→M is surjective, i.e., ∀m1 ∈M, ∃l1 ∈ L : α(l1) = m1.
Typically data are shared only from a few security classes of any organisation.
Organisations rarely make public their entire security class structure and permit-
ted flow policies. Organisations also typically do not want any external influences
on some subsets of its security classes. Thus, if not all elements ofM are transfer
classes, it may be impossible to define a Galois insertion (L, α, γ,M) because we
cannot force α to be surjective.
Lagois Connections. Further, the connection we seek to make between two
domains should allow us to transpose them. Fortunately there is an elegant
structure, i.e., Lagois Connections [16], which exactly satisfies this as well as
the requirements of security and bidirectional sharing (SC1, SC2, PC1, PC2,
CC1 and CC2). They also conveniently generalise Galois Insertions.
Definition 1 (Lagois Connection [16]). If L = (L,⊑) and M = (M,⊑′)
are two partially ordered sets, and α : L → M and γ : M → L are order-
preserving functions, then we call the quadruple (L, α, γ,M) an increasing Lagois
connection, if it satisfies the following properties:
LC1 λl.l ⊑ γ ◦ α LC2 λm′.m′ ⊑′ α ◦ γ
LC3 α ◦ γ ◦ α = α LC4 γ ◦ α ◦ γ = γ
LC3 ensures that γ(α(c1)) is the least upper bound of all security classes in
C that are mapped to the same security class, say u1 = α(c1) in U .
The main result of this section is that if the negotiated monotone functions
α and γ form a Lagois connection between the security lattices L and M , then
information flows permitted are secure and precise.
Theorem 2. Let L and M be two complete security class lattices, α : L → M
and γ : M → L be two monotone functions. Then the flow of information
permitted by α, γ satisfies conditions SC1, SC2, PC1, PC2, CC1 and CC2
if (L, α, γ,M) is an increasing Lagois connection.
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Proof. Condition SC1 holds because if α(l1) ⊑
′ m2, by monotonicity of γ,
γ(α(l1)) ⊑ γ(m2). But by LC1, l1 ⊑ γ(α(l1)). So l1 ⊑ γ(m2). (A symmetric ar-
gument holds for SC2.) Conditions PC1 and PC2 are shown in Proposition 3.7
of [16]. Conditions CC1 and CC2 hold since the compositions γ◦α and α◦γ are
closure operators, i.e., idempotent, extensive, order-preserving endo-functions on
L and M .
In fact, Lagois connections ensure that information in a security class in the
original domain remains accessible even after doing a round-trip from the other
domain (Proposition 3.8 in [16]):
γ(α(l)) = ⊓{l∗ ∈ γ[M ] | l ⊑ l∗}, (1)
α(γ(m)) = ⊓{m∗ ∈ α[L] | m ⊑′ m∗}. (2)
We list various propositions about Lagois connections, which illustrate some of
their important properties. In particular, the two functions γ and α uniquely
determine each other. Moreover, there are largest members of their pre-images,
which act as representatives for the equivalence classes of the equivalence rela-
tions ∼M and∼L induced by these functions. Further, since our security domains
are complete lattices, these distinguished points are closed under meets.
Proposition 3 (Proposition 3.7 in [16]). Let (L, α, γ,M) be a Lagois con-
nection and let m ∈ α[L] and l ∈ γ[M ]. The α−1(m) has a largest member,
which is γ(m), and γ−1(l) has a largest member, which is α(l).
This means that for all m ∈ α[L] and l ∈ γ[M ], γ(m) and α(l) exist, and are
defined by largest members in their pre-image. Also, the images γ[M ] and α[L]
are isomorphic lattices.
M∗ = α[γ[M ]] = α[L] defines a system of representatives for ∼M . Then,
α(γ(m′)) is the representative of the equivalence class [m′] of m′ that lies inM∗,
called budpoint, such that,
if m ∈M and m∗ ∈M∗ with m ∼M m
∗ then m ⊑′ m∗ (3)
Symmetrically, L∗ = γ[α[L]] = γ[M ] defines a system of representatives for ∼L.
Proposition 4 (Proposition 3.9 in [16]). If (L, α, γ,M) is a Lagois connec-
tion, then the functions α and γ uniquely determine each other; in fact
γ(m) =
⊔
α−1 [ ⊓{ m∗ ∈ α[L] | m ⊑′ m∗} ] (4)
α(l) =
⊔
γ−1[ ⊓{ l∗ ∈ γ [ M ] | l ⊑ l∗} ] (5)
Proposition 5 (Proposition 3.11 in [16]). If (L, α, γ,M) is a Lagois con-
nection and A ⊆ γ[M ], then
1. the meet of A in γ[M ] exists if and only if the meet of A in L exists, and
whenever either exists, they are equal.
2. the join aˆ of A in γ[M ] exists if the join aˇ of A in L exists, and in this case
aˆ = γ(α(aˇ))
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3 An Operational Model
3.1 Computational Model.
Let us consider two different organisations L and M that want to share data
with each other. We start with the assumptions that the two domains comprise
storage objects Z and Z ′ respectively, which are manipulated using their own
sets of atomic transactional operations, ranged over by t and t′ respectively. We
further assume that these transactions within each domain are internally secure
with respect to their flow models, and have no insecure or interfering interactions
with the environment. Thus, we are agnostic to the level of abstraction of the
systems we aim to connect securely, and since our approach treats the applica-
tion domains as “black boxes”, it is readily adaptable to any level of discourse
(language, system, OS, database) found in the security literature.
We extend these operations with a minimal set of operations to transfer
data between the two domains. To avoid any concurrency effects, interference
or race conditions arising from inter-domain transfer, we augment the storage
objects of both domains with a fresh set of export and import variables into/from
which the data of the domain objects can be copied atomically. We designate
these sets X,X ′ as the respective export variables, and Y , Y ′ as the respective
import variables, with the corresponding variable instances written as xi, x
′
i and
yi, y
′
i. These export and import variables form mutually disjoint sets, and are
distinct from any extant domain objects manipulated by the applications within
a domain. These variables are used exclusively for transfer, and are manipulated
atomically. We let wi range over all variables in N = Z∪X∪Y (respectively w
′
i
over N ′ = Z ′∪X ′∪Y ′). Domain objects are copied to export variables and from
import variables by special operations rd(z, y) and wr(x, z) (and rd′(z′, y′) and
wr′(x′, z′) in the other domain). We assume atomic transfer operations (trusted
by both domains) TRL, TLR that copy data from the export variables of one
domain to the import variables of the other domain as the only mechanism for
inter-domain flow of data. Let “phrase” p denote a command in either domain or
a transfer operation, and let s be any (empty or non-empty) sequence of phrases.
(command) c ::= t | rd(z, y) | wr(x, z) c′ ::= t′ | rd′(z′, y′) | wr′(x′, z′)
(phrase) p ::= TRL(x
′, y) | TLR(x, y
′) | c | c′ (seq) s ::= ǫ | s1; p
A store (typically µ, ν, µ′, ν′) is a finite-domain function from variables to a
set of values (not further specified). We write, e.g., µ(w) for the contents of the
store µ at variable w, and µ[w := µ′(w′)] for the store that is the same as µ
everywhere except at variable w, where it now takes value µ′(w′).
The rules specifying execution of commands are given in Fig. 8. Assuming
the specification of intradomain transactions of the form µ ⊢ t =⇒ ν and
µ′ ⊢ t′ =⇒ ν′, our rules allow us to specify judgments of the form 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢
p =⇒ 〈ν, ν′〉 for phrases, and (the reflexive-transitive closure) for sequences
of phrases. Note that phrase execution occurs atomically, and the intra-domain
transactions, as well as copying to and from the export/import variables affect
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T
µ ⊢ t ⇒ ν
〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ t ⇒ 〈ν, µ′〉
T’
µ
′ ⊢ t′ ⇒ ν′
〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ t′ ⇒ 〈µ, ν′〉
Wr 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ wr(x, z)⇒ 〈µ[x := µ(z)], µ′〉
Wr’ 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ wr′(x′, z′)⇒ 〈µ, µ′[x′ := µ′(z′)]〉
Rd 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ rd(z, y) ⇒ 〈µ[z := µ(y)], µ′〉
Rd’ 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ rd′(z′, y′) ⇒ 〈µ, µ′[z′ := µ′(y′)]〉
Trl 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ TRL(y, x
′)⇒ 〈µ[y := µ′(x′)], µ′〉
Tlr 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ TLR(y
′
, x)⇒ 〈µ, µ′[y′ := µ(x)]〉
Seq0 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ ǫ⇒∗ 〈µ, µ′〉
Seqs
〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ s1 ⇒
∗ 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉, 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉 ⊢ p ⇒ 〈µ2, µ
′
2〉
〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ s1; p ⇒
∗ 〈µ2, µ
′
2〉
Fig. 8. Execution Rules
the store in only one domain, whereas the atomic transfer is only between export
variables of one domain and the import variables of the other.
3.2 Typing Rules
Let the two domains have the respective different IFMs:
FML = 〈N,P , SC,⊔,⊑〉 FMM = 〈N
′, P ′, SC′,⊔,⊑′〉,
such that the flow policies in both are defined over different sets of security
classes SC and SC′.2
The (security) types of the core language are as follows.
Metavariables l and m′ range over the sets of security classes, SC and SC′
respectively, which are partially ordered by ⊑ and ⊑′. A type assignment λ is a
finite-domain function from variables N to SC (respectively, λ′ from N ′ to SC′).
The important restriction we place on λ and λ′ is that they map export and
import variables X,X, Y ′, Y only to points in the security lattices SC and SC′
respectively which are in the domains of γ and α, i.e., these points participate
in the Lagois connection. Intuitively, a variable w mapped to security class l can
store information of security class l or lower. The type system works with respect
to given type assignment. Given the security level, e.g., l, the typing rules track
for each command within that domain whether all written-to variables in that
domain are of security classes “above” l, and additionally for transactions within
a domain, they ensure “simple security”, i.e., that all variables which may have
been read belong to security classes “below” l. We assume for the transactions
within a domain, e.g., L, we have a type system that will give us judgments of the
form λ ⊢ c : l. The novel extension of our approach is to extend this framework
to work over two connected domains, i.e., given implicit security levels of the
2 Without loss of generality, we assume that SC ∩ SC′ = ∅, since we can suitably
rename security classes.
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Tt
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ t : 〈l,m′〉 if for all z assigned in t, l ⊑ λ(z)
& for all z1 read in t, λ(z1) ⊑ l
Tt’
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ t′ : 〈l, m′〉 if for all z′ assigned in t′, m′ ⊑′ λ′(z′)
& for all z′1 read in t
′, λ′(z′1) ⊑
′
m
′
Trd
λ(y) ⊑ λ(z)
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ rd(z, y) : 〈λ(z),m′〉
Trd’
λ
′(y′) ⊑′ λ′(z′)
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ rd′(z′, y′) : 〈l, λ′(z′)〉
Twr
λ(z) ⊑ λ(x)
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ wr(x, z) : 〈λ(x),m′〉
Twr’
λ
′(z′) ⊑′ λ′(x′)
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ wr′(x′, z′) : 〈l, λ′(x′)〉
TTRL
γ(λ′(x′)) ⊑ λ(y)
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ TRL(y, x
′) : 〈λ(y), λ′(x′)〉
TTLR’
α(λ(x)) ⊑′ λ′(y′)
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ TLR(y
′
, x) : 〈λ(x), λ′(y′)〉
Com0 〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ ǫ : 〈l, m′〉
ComP
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ p : 〈l1,m
′
1〉 〈λ, λ
′〉 ⊢ s : 〈l,m′〉
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ s; p : 〈l1⊓l,m
′
1⊓m
′〉
Fig. 9. Typing rules
contexts in the respective domains. Cross-domain transfers will require pairing
such judgments, and thus our type systems will have judgments of the form
〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ p : 〈l,m′〉
We introduce a syntax-directed set of typing rules for the core language,
given in Fig. 9. In many of the rules, the type for one of the domains is not
constrained by the rule, and so any suitable type may be chosen as determined
by the context, e.g., m′ in the rules Tt, Trd, Twr and TTRL, and both l and
m′ in Com0.
For transactions e.g., t entirely within domain L, the typing rule Tt con-
strains the type in the left domain to be at a level l that dominates all variables
read in t, and which is dominated by all variables written to in t, but places
no constraints on the type m′ in the other domain M . In the rule Trd, since
a value in import variable y is copied to the variable z, we have λ(y) ⊑ λ(z),
and the type in the domain L is λ(z) with no constraint on the type m′ in the
other domain. Conversely, in the rule Twr, since a value in variable z is copied
to the export variable x, we have λ(z) ⊑ λ(x), and the type in the domain L is
λ(x) with no constraint on the type m′ in the other domain. In the rule TTRL,
since the contents of a variable x′ in domain M are copied into a variable y in
domain L, we require γ(λ′(x′)) ⊑ λ(y), and constrain the type in domain L to
λ(y). The constraint in the other domain is unimportant (but for the sake of
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convenience, we peg it at λ′(x′)). Finally, for the types of sequences of phrases,
we take the meets of the collected types in each domain respectively, so that we
can guarantee that no variable of type lower than these meets has been written
into during the sequence. Note that Proposition 5 ensures that these types have
the desired properties for participating in the Lagois connection.
3.3 Soundness
We now establish soundness of our scheme by showing a non-interference theorem
with respect to operational semantics and the type systems built on the security
lattices. This theorem may be viewed as a conservative adaptation (to a minimal
secure data transfer framework in a Lagois-connected pair of domains) of the
main result of Volpano et al [23].
We assume that underlying base transactional languages in each of the do-
mains have the following simple property (stated for L, but an analogous prop-
erty is assumed for M): Within each transaction t, for each assignment of an
expression e to any variable z, the following holds: If µ, ν are two stores such
that for all w ∈ vars(e), we have µ(w) = ν(w), then after executing the assign-
ment, we will get µ(z) = ν(z). That is, if two stores are equal for all variables
appearing in the expression e, then the value assigned to the variable z will
be the same. This assumption plays the roˆle of “Simple Security” of expressions
in [23] in the proof of the main theorem. The type system plays the roˆle of “Con-
finement”. We start with two obvious lemmas about the operational semantics,
namely preservation of domains, and a “frame” lemma:
Lemma 6 (Domain preservation). If 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ s⇒∗ 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉, then dom(µ) =
dom(µ1), and dom(µ
′) = dom(µ′1).
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ s⇒∗ 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉.
Lemma 7 (Frame). If 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ s ⇒∗ 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉, w ∈ dom(µ) ∪ dom(µ
′), and w
is not assigned to in s, then µ(w) = µ1(w) and µ
′(w) = µ′1(w).
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ s⇒∗ 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉.
The main result of the paper assumes an “adversary” that operates at a
security level l in domain L and at security level m′ in domainM . Note however,
that these two levels are interconnected by the monotone functions α : L→ M
and γ :M → L, since these levels are connected by the ability of information at
one level in one domain to flow to the other level in the other domain.
Theorem 8 (Type Soundness). Suppose l,m′ are the “adversarial” type lev-
els in the respective domains, which satisfy the condition l = γ(m′) and m′ =
α(l). Let
(a) 〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ s : 〈l0,m
′
0〉;
(b) 〈µ, µ′〉 ⊢ s⇒∗ 〈µf , µ
′
f 〉;
(c) 〈ν, ν′〉 ⊢ s⇒∗ 〈νf , ν
′
f 〉;
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(d) dom(µ) = dom(ν) = dom(λ) and dom(µ′) = dom(ν′) = dom(λ′);
(e) µ(w) = ν(w) for all w such that λ(w) ⊑ l, and µ′(w′) = ν′(w′) for all w′
such that λ′(w′) ⊑′ m′.
Then µf (w) = νf (w) for all w such that λ(w) ⊑ l, and µ
′
f (w
′) = ν′f (w
′) for all
w′ such that λ′(w′) ⊑′ m′.
Proof. By induction on the length of sequence s. The base case is vacuously true.
We now consider a sequence s1; p. 〈µ, µ
′〉 ⊢ s1 ⇒
∗ 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉 and 〈µ1, µ
′
1〉 ⊢ p ⇒
〈µf , µ
′
f 〉 and 〈ν, ν
′〉 ⊢ s1 ⇒
∗ 〈ν1, ν
′
1〉 and 〈ν1, ν
′
1〉 ⊢ p ⇒ 〈νf , ν
′
f 〉 By induction
hypothesis applied to s1, we have µ1(w) = ν1(w) for all w such that λ(w) ⊑ l,
and µ′1(w
′) = ν′1(w
′) for all w′ such that λ′(w′) ⊑′ m′.
Let 〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ s1 : 〈ls,m
′
s〉, and 〈λ, λ
′〉 ⊢ p : 〈lp,m
′
p〉. We examine four cases
for p (the remaining cases are symmetrical).
Case p is t: Consider any w such that λ(w) ⊑ l. If w ∈ X ∪ Y (i.e., it doesn’t
appear in t), or if w ∈ Z but is not assigned to in t, then by Lemma 7 and the
induction hypothesis, µf (w) = µ1(w) = ν1(w) = νf (w).
Now suppose z is assigned to in t. From the condition 〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ p : 〈lp,m
′
p〉, we
know that for all z1 assigned in t, lp ⊑ λ(z1) and for all z1 read in t, λ(z1) ⊑ lp.
Now if l ⊑ lp, then since in t no variables z2 such that λ(z2) ⊑ l are assigned
to. Therefore by Lemma 7, µf (w) = µ1(w) = ν1(w) = νf (w), for all w such that
λ(w) ⊑ l.
If lp ⊑ l, then for all z1 read in t, λ(z1) ⊑ lp. Therefore, by assumption on
transaction t, if any variable z is assigned an expression e, since µ1, ν1 are two
stores such that for all z1 ∈ Ze = vars(e), µ1(z1) = ν1(z1), the value of e will
be the same. By this simple security argument, after the transaction t, we have
µf (z) = νf (z). Since the transaction happened entirely and atomically in do-
main L, we do not have to worry ourselves with changes in the other domain
M , and do not need to concern ourselves with the adversarial level m′.
Case p is rd(z, y): Thus 〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ rd(z, y) : 〈λ(z),m′〉, which means λ(y)⊑ λ(z).
If l ⊑ λ(z), there is nothing to prove (Lemma 7, again). If λ(z) ⊑ l, then since
by I.H., µ1(y) = ν1(y), we have µf (z) = µ1[z := µ1(y)](z) = ν1[z := ν1(y)](z) =
νf (z).
Case p is wr(x, z): Thus 〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ wr(x, z) : 〈λ(x),m′〉, which means λ(z)⊑ λ(x).
If l ⊑ λ(x), there is nothing to prove (Lemma 7, again). If λ(x) ⊑ l, then since
by I.H., µ1(z) = ν1(z), we have µf (x) = µ1[x := µ1(z)](x) = ν1[x := ν1(z)](x) =
νf (x).
Case p is TRL(y, x
′): So 〈λ, λ′〉 ⊢ TRL(y, x
′) : 〈λ(y), λ′(x′)〉, and γ(λ′(x′))⊑ λ(y).
If l ⊑ λ(y), there is nothing to prove (Lemma 7, again). If λ(y) ⊑ l, then by
transitivity, γ(λ′(x′)) ⊑ l. By monotonicity of α: α(γ(λ′(x′))) ⊑′ α(l) = m′
(By our assumption on l and m′). But by LC2, λ′(x′) ⊑′ α(γ(λ′(x′))). So
by transitivity, λ′(x′) ⊑′ m′. Now, by I.H., since µ′1(x
′) = ν′1(x
′), we have
µf (y) = µ1[y := µ
′
1(x
′)](y) = ν1[y := ν
′
1(x
′)](y) = νf (y).
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4 Related Work
The notion of Lagois connections [16] has surprisingly not been employed much
in computer science. The only cited use of this idea seems to be the work of
Huth [11] in establishing the correctness of programming language implementa-
tions. To our knowledge, our work is the only one to propose their use in secure
information flow control.
Abstract Interpretation and type systems [5] have been used in secure flow
analyses, e.g., [3, 4] and [24], where security types are defined using Galois con-
nections employing, for instance, a standard collecting semantics. Their use of
two domains, concrete and abstract, with a Galois connection between them, for
performing static analyses within a single domain should not be confused with
our idea of secure connections between independently-defined security lattices of
two organisations.
There has been substantial work on SIF in a distributed setting at the systems
level. DStar [26] for example, uses sets of opaque identifiers to define security
classes. The DStar framework extends a particular DIFC model [12,25] for oper-
ating systems to a distributed network. The only partial order that is considered
in DStar’s security lattice is subset inclusion. So it is not clear if DStar can work
on general IFC mechanisms such as FlowCaml [19], which can use any partial
ordering. Nor can it express the labels of JiF [17] or Fabric [13] completely.
DStar allows bidirectional communication between processes R and S only if
LR ⊑OR LS and LS ⊑OS LR, i.e., if there is an order-isomorphism between the
labels. Our motivating examples indicate such a requirement is far too restrictive
for most practical arrangements for data sharing between organisations.
Fabric [13,14] adds trust relationships directly derived from a principal hier-
archy to support federated systems with mutually distrustful nodes and allows
dynamic delegation of authority.
Most of the previous DIFC mechanisms [2,8,12,17,20,25] including Fabric are
susceptible to the vulnerabilities illustrated in our motivating examples, which
we will mention in the concluding discussion.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Our work is similar in spirit to Denning’s motivation for proposing lattices,
namely to identify a simple and mathematically elegant structure in which to
frame the construction of scalable secure information flow in a modular manner
that preserved the autonomy of the individual organisations. From the basic
requirements, we identified the elegant theory of Lagois connections as an ap-
propriate structure. Lagois connections provide us a way to connect the security
lattices of two (secure) systems in a manner that does not expose their entire
internal structure and allows us to reason only in terms of the interfaced secu-
rity classes. We believe that this framework is also applicable in more intricate
information flow control formulations such as decentralised IFC [18] and mod-
els with declassification, as well as formulations with data-dependent security
classes [15]. We intend to explore these aspects in the future.
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In this paper, we also proposed a minimal operational model for the transfer
of data between the two domains. This formulation is spare enough to be adapt-
able at various levels of abstraction (programming language, systems, databases),
and is intended to illustrate that the Lagois connection framework can conserve
security, using non-interference as the semantic notion of soundness. The choice
of non-interference and the use of a type system in the manner of Volpano et
al. [23] was to illustrate in familiar terms how those techniques (removed from
a particular language formulation) could be readily adapted to work in the con-
text of secure connections between lattices. In this exercise, we made suitable
assumptions of atomicity and the use of fresh variables for communication, so
as to avoid usual sources of interference. We believe that the Lagois connection
framework for secure flows between systems is readily adaptable for notions of
semantic correctness other than non-interference, though that is an exercise for
the future.
In the future we intend to explore how the theory of Lagois connections
constitutes a robust framework that can support the discovery, decomposition,
update and maintenance of secure MoUs for exchanging information. In this
paper, we concerned ourselves only with two domains and bidirectional infor-
mation exchange. Compositionality of Lagois connections allows these results to
extend to chaining connections across several domains. In the future, we also
intend to explore how one may secure more complicated information exchange
arrangements than merely chains of bidirectional flow.
We close this discussion with a reminder of why it is important to have a
framework in which secure flows should be treated in a modular and autonomous
manner. Consider Myer’s DIFC model described in [18], where a principal can
delegate to others the capacity to act on its behalf. We believe that this notion
does not scale well to large, networked systems since a principal may repose
different levels of trust in the various hosts in the network. For this reason,
we believe that frameworks such as Fabric [13, 14] may provide more power
than mandated by a principle of least privilege. In general, since a principal
rarely vests unqualified trust in another in all contexts and situations, one should
confine the influence of the principals possessing delegated authority to only
specific domains. A mathematical framework that can deal with localising trust
and delegation of authority in different domains and controlling the manner in
which information flow can be secured deserves a deeper study. We believe that
algebraic theories such as Lagois connections can provide the necessary structure
for articulating these concepts.
Acknowledgments. The second author thanks Deepak Garg for insightful discus-
sions on secure information flow. Part of the title is stolen from E.M. Forster.
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